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NEGLIGENCE OF FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION DELEGATES UNDER THE
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
ANDREW J. DILK*
INTRODUCTION
T HE FEDERAL Aviation Administration (FAA) has been
authorized by statute to delegate various responsibilities to pri-
vate individuals who are either designated "representatives" or are
"certificated." The legislative history of the statute indicates that
the purpose of this delegation was to avoid a substantial increase
in the number of Federal employees; no desire is indicated to have
these individuals categorized as "employees" within the meaning
of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), or to assume Federal re-
sponsibility for their acts. Until Congress includes these persons
within the coverage of the FTCA as employees, the traditional con-
cept of the "independent contractor" doctrine should block gov-
ernmental liability for their negligent acts and omissions. Ad-
mittedly, there is no clearly defined rule as to the relationship
existing between a federal agency and private individuals; however
the customary absence of a contractual relationship between these
individuals and the Government, the absence of federal pay, and
most important, the absence of positive control and direction by
the FAA, casts them in the traditionally-accepted role of independ-
ent contractors. In this role, there is no indication that Congress
intended the United States to become an insurer against the negli-
gent acts and omissions of FAA certificate holders.
* J.D. Georgetown Law School, 1965; Presently employed in the office of
the Chief Counsel, FAA-Litigation Division.
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I. LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY FOR FAA DELEGATION
Section 314 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958' authorizes'
delegation of powers and duties by the Federal Aviation Adminis-
trator to private persons.' Section 314 (a) states:
In exercising the powers and duties vested in him by this chapter
the Administrator may, subject to such regulations, supervision,
149 U.S.C. § 1355 (1970). Section 6(c)(1) of the Department of Transpor-
tation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1655(c)(1) (1970), transferred most functions, powers
and duties of the Federal Aviation Administrator and the Federal Aviation Agen-
cy to the Secretary of Transportation. In 49 C.F.R. § 1.47 (1975) the Secretary
of Transportation in turn delegated to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration. It should be borne in mind that "the general rule is that a statute
which does not purport to establish a civil liability, but merely makes provision
to secure the safety or welfare of the public as an entity, is not subject to a
construction establishing a civil liability." 73 AM. JUR. 2d Statutes 5 432 (1974);
Kirk v. United States, 270 F.2d 110, 117 (9th Cir. 1959). See, Marival, Inc. v.
Planes, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 855, 860, n.1 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (dictum).
' The nature of legislative delegation, its constitutionality, and the purpose of
the act involved so as to effectuate a Congressional policy is well recognized.
See, e.g., Maryland v. United States, 381 U.S. 41, 51 n.32 (1965); Alexander
Wool Combing Co. v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948). An interest in ex-
panded delegation within the FAA was expressed in a memorandum from the
Secretary of Transportation to Department of Transportation Administrators
and Assistant Secretaries (Jan. 27, 1969). It expressed an intent to vest authority
to make decisions" . . . as close as possible to the point where a service is ac-
tually performed." The FAA operated on a more centralized basis until 1961,
at which time it undertook a program of comprehensive decentralization of au-
thority to Regional Directors. In 1965, further decentralization was effected by
the creation of eighteen area offices within the continental United States, eight in
Alaska, four in the Pacific, one in Balboa, and one in Puerto Rico. This was
done to establish a management and decision level closer to actual aeronautical
operations.
' The legislative history of the statute indicates that the alternative to delega-
tion of such powers and duties to private persons was an increase in the number
of federal employees:
The report of the Department of Commerce submitted to this com-
mittee showing the need for this legislation stated that the Civil
Aeronautics Administration through use of qualified private persons
in lieu of regular CAA employees has eliminated the need for the
employment of approximately 10,000 Government personnel to
carry out safety inspection services.
S. REP. No. 803, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1949); See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, FACTS AND FUNCTIONS (1971). The significance of legislative
history is seen in a case dealing with a statute authorizing the designation of a
person to employ a caretaker for National Guard property. In Maryland v.
United States, 381 U.S. 41, vacated, 382 U.S. 159 (1965), the Supreme Court
looked to the legislative history, holding that civilian caretakers were not regarded
as federal employees. The statutory language and legislative history regarding the
intent of extra-agency delegation or sub-delegation will bear significant weight.
Sub-delegation within an agency is the subject of Note, Subdelegation by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 12 STAN. L. REv. 808 (1960); its reasoning as to the
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and review as he may prescribe, delegate to any properly qualified
private person, or to any employee or employees under the super-
vision of such person, any work, business, or function respecting
1) the examination, inspection, and testing necessary to the issu-
ance of certificates under Subchapter VP of this chapter and 2)
the issuance of such certicates in accordance with standards estab-
lished by him. The Administrator may establish the maximum fees'
which such private persons may charge for their services and may
rescind any delegation made by him pursuant to this subsection at
any time and for any reason which he deems appropriate. (foot-
notes added)
Congressional delegations of power to federal agencies, or to
private parties subject to agency regulations, have undergone few
judicial investigations in recent years! In United States v. Rock
Royal Co-Op, Inc.' the Supreme Court acknowledged the Congres-
sional power to effectuate delegation or sub-delegation by a legis-
lative scheme, noting that "[I]t is no argument against the consti-
intra-agency sub-delegation would seem applicable to the extra-agency delegation
involved in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. This would seem especially true
since the FAA is not involved here with any power to initiate cases nor the
rendering of final decisions. The largess of delegation and subdelegation is ack-
nowledged in I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 9.02, at 619 (1958),
where it is stated that, "The extent of permissible subdelegation by federal officers
depends primarily upon the intent of Congress."
'Title VI concerns the Safety Regulation of Civil Aeronautics, including air-
man, aircraft, air carrier operating, and airport operating certificates in addition
to the maintenance of equipment. A precatory note to all FAA delegations, espe-
cially within an agency which has safety as a primary goal, is found in Note,
supra note 3. The article poignantly observes that agency designates might exer-
cise more care if they knew that the United States would not be liable. Having
safety as its primary goal, the FAA is unquestionably responsible for care in the
selection of delegates. See, e.g., Rapp v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 264 F. Supp.
673 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
Though the Secretary may establish fees, he has not done so. 14 C.F.R. pt.
187 (1976) concerns fees and does not provide for payment of any. The attitude
of the FAA has been that fees between applicants and its representatives will be
based on what the traffic will bear. See, e.g., FAA Order No. 8520.3A, Guide for
Aviation Medical Examiners, which provides in paragraph L that "The Federal
Aviation Administration does not recommend fees to be charged by Examiners
for the physical examination of airman applicants. It is suggested that the fee be
commensurate with that established for like services in the area." One inherent
danger with this practice is that the designated private person is paid by the
applicant, not by the agency which he is serving in some quasi-representative
capacity; this method of payment may lead to less objective evaluations.
I1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 2.14 (1958). This is so even
with respect to delegation of extremely broad power.
'307 U.S. 533, 574 (1939).
1976]
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tutionality of an act to say that it delegates broad powers to execu-
tives to determine the details of any legislative scheme." It is by
virtue of such "certification" that the FAA unquestionably pro-
vides some indicium of ostensible authority upon which individuals
could rely. A review of material relating to licenses, certificates,
franchises, and similar rights received from a public authority
initially indicates that a delegate's receipt of an FAA certificate
logically implies some official status and authority to bind the
agency. In the absence of actual FAA employment, the position
of a delegate holding FAA authority would flow from his certificate,
without any federal office."8
The plethora of cases questioning sub-delegation within an
agency do not deal with an enabling statute which specifically pro-
vides for delegation to individuals outside the agency. Since the
dangers of "irresponsible" or less competent subordinates remains
constant in both situations, the language used by legal writers and
courts" suggests that their reasoning applies to delegations both
within and without an agency.
A. Certificated "Representatives"
Delegation of authority to "private persons"" is primarily found
' When a federal office is involved which is filled by a person who is acting
under color of authority in discharging the duties of that office, his actions are
those of an officer de facto, and would normally be binding on the public or
third parties. McDowell v. United States, 159 U.S. 596 (1895); United States
ex rel. Dors v. Lindsley, 148 F.2d 22 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 838(1945). Despite the distinct absence of federal office, the possession of a certifi-
cate by which a private person holds himself out as an FAA representative does
lend some credence to the aviation public's belief that a delegate is authorized
to make some technical appraisals for the FAA.
I 1 K. DAvIs, supra note 6. The principal problem in delegation to "lay
groups" is "unbounded discretion in private parties"; however, because of the
generally technical or mechanical requirements provided by the FAA administra-
tive orders, this discretion is limited. The delegation to lay groups is discussed in
Note, Delegation of Power to Private Parties, 37 CoLuM. L. REv. 447 (1937),
which describes the requirement of an "adequate standard" in the guidance of
private action and for judicial review as the soundest theory in evaluation of
rulemaking power. Such legal writings generally deal with the problem of the
delegation of the powers of adjudication and rule making, rather than conformity
to regulatory standards, and are therefore only indirectly beneficial.
"0See, e.g., Fleming v. Easton Pub. Co., 38 F. Supp. 677 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
11 Delegations not to individuals, but to "pilot schools" (including ground
schools, flying schools and pilot training courses) are certificates described in
14 C.F.R. pt. 141 (1976), rather than the personal representative certificates de-
scribed in 14 C.F.R. pt. 183 (1976). Delegations to entities other than individuals
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in part 183 of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which
provides for the "certification" of representatives." The certification
of representatives found in part 183 was expressed in its present
language when still part of the Regulations of the Administrator of
the Civil Aeronautics Administration.13 The selection of those rep-
resentatives includes two types of selections made by the Flight
Standards Service."'
The selection of Air Traffic Control Tower Operator Examiners
provided for in part 183.11(d) 5 no longer occurs; their training
and examination takes place at the FAA Aeronautical Center in
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
1. Designated "Representatives"
Subpart C of part 183 specifies the designation for which certi-
are found in Subparts J and M of 14 C.F.R. pt. 21 (1976). Subpart J is rather
abstrusely entitled "Delegation Option Authorization Procedures," and refers to
a corporate designation by which the manufacturer, in accordance with the ligi-
bility requirements in 14 C.F.R. § 21.239 (1976), holds current type and pro-
duction certificates for aircraft manufactured by it and employs competent engi-
neering personnel which allows it to make type certification changes in the type
design, amendments to type certificates, and approve major repairs or alterations.
Subpart M is entitled "Designated Alteration Station Authorization Procedures"
(DAS) and allows either a certificated repair station, air carrier (but not air taxi
operators) or commercial operator, or manufacturer, to issue supplemental type
certificates, amend standard airworthiness certificates, or issue experimental cer-
tificates. Such designation may be issued to a domestic repair station certificated
under 14 C.F.R. pt. 145 (1976), an air carrier or commercial operator that holds
an operating certificate under 14 C.F.R. pt. 121 (1976), or a manufacturer of a
product for which it has alteration authority under 14 C.F.R. 5 43.3(i) (1976)
who meets the requirements of Subpart M, as to the existence of adequate main-
tenance facilities and personnel. At the present time only Pan American World
Airways and American Airlines hold DAS authorizations.
12 The scope of the certification of representatives is stated in 14 C.F.R. S
183.1 (1976), which describes their functions as " ... examining, inspecting, and
testing persons and aircraft for the purpose of issuing airman and aircraft cer-
tificates."
13As a regulation of the CAA it was found in 14 C.F.R. Part 418.
14 The selection made in accordance with 14 C.F.R. § 183.11(b) (1976) is
by a local FAA Flight Standards Inspector. The word "local" means on a geo-
graphical basis of varying boundaries, which is described in each FAA Order im-
plementing the rules in providing for kinds of designations. The selection made
in accordance with 14 C.F.R. S 183.11(b) (1976) is by the Chief of the Engi-
neering and Manufacturing Division in Washington, which is a part of Flight
Standards, or by that person's designee, who is a Designated Manufacturing In-
spection Representative described in 14 C.F.R. § 183.31 (1976).
1 The duties of these examiners are described in 14 C.F.R. 5 183.25(c)
(1976).
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fication8 is granted. Though part 183.21 makes no mention of legal
representation for Aviation Medical Examiners in the event of a
lawsuit alleging negligence in examination, FAA Order 8520.3A'
does deal with their legal responsibilities. Paragraph C of Chapter
1 of that order is entitled "Legal Responsibilities of Designated
Aviation Medical Examiners",'8 and merely points out in part that,
If the examination is cursory and the Examiner fails to find a dis-
qualifying physical defect which should have been discovered in
the course of a thorough and careful examination, the FAA and
the Medical Examiner have placed a safety hazard in the air and
must bear the responsiiblity for the results of such action. If the
airman is thereafter involved in an accident, caused or contributed
to by his disability, and as a result passengers or persons on the
ground lose their lives, both the FAA and the examining physician
may be subject to suit for their negligence. (emphasis added)
However, the order does not indicate that the Department accepts
responsibility for the negligent acts of medical examiners, and the
Department of Justice maintains that position. The status of a
medical examiner as licensed to practice medicine, and thereby
qualified as a member of a highly educated and well-trained group,
"'This "certification" is described in 14 C.F.R. § 183.13 (1976), and merely
describes the documentary evidence of FAA representation (These appurtenances
of representative authority are somewhat clumsily defined.) The "Certificate of
Designation" seen in 14 C.F.R. § 183.13(a) (1976) is a diploma which indicates
membership in the medical or forensic pathologist classification. The "Certificate
of Authority" in 14 C.F.R. § 183.13(b) (1976) is a mobile identification card
which defines the particular subclass of Flight Standards responsibility of 14
C.F.R. §§ 183.25-183.31 (1976). The procedures for medical certification are
found in 14 C.F.R. § 183.11 (1976).
"' Guide for Aviation Medical Examiners (June 1970). This Guide is the
Federal Air Surgeon's interpretation of the Medical Standards and Certification
found in 14 C.F.R. pt. 67 (1976), and its distribution is restricted to designated
examiners in order to prevent prior familiarization by applicants. In FAA Order
No. 8520.2A, at Para. 56(3)(b) (Feb. 19, 1970) the AME is advised of his
assumption of responsibility. Specific reference is made to physical examinations
conducted at a clinic, when certain parts of the examination are delegated by the
AME to another physician: "In such cases the AME shall review, certify, and
assume responsibility for the accuracy and completeness of the total report of
examination. : . ." (emphasis added).
18 It notes the existence of some 475,000 applications for airmen medical
certificates yearly, over ninety-nine per cent of which are conducted by designated
private practitioners. These examinations, being given in accordance with 14
C.F.R. at 67 (1976), are subject to reconsideration by the Federal Air Surgeon
or his authorized representative within the FAA. The Federal Air Surgeon, or
his authorized representative within the FAA, may select Examiners from qualified
physicians who apply, and these designations are renewable yearly.
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has no real counterpart among the other FAA representatives. "
Although FAA Order 8520.3A (the Guide for Aviation Medical
Examiners) is similar to the orders implementing the designations
of other representatives since it provides directions for the conduct
of the work, it is also distinctive because it does not provide for
their training or attempt any real supervision.
The other non-medical representatives are listed in Subpart C,
and are selected for one year by local Flight Standards Inspectors.
These representatives are Pilot Examiners!* to serve general avia-
tion, 1 technical personnel examiners listed in part 183.25, includ-
" The broad license given to medical examiners by the FAA which constitutes
a significant mark of their independence is a result of the prestige of the medical
profession. See Note, Delegation of Power to Private Parties, 37 COL. L. REV.
447, 456 (1937), which explains the reasoning behind the inability to exercise
any significant influence over the medical profession:
Thus the inability of the legislature to prescribe in advance the
requirements of a medical school, a diploma from which is con-
dition precedent to the issuance by a state board of a license to
practice medicine, may justify delegation to the American Medical
Association of the power to determine such requirements from year
to year.
20 Each of these examiners accepts the necessary applications for flight tests
prerequisite to the issuance of pilot certificates and ratings in accordance with
the requirements for designations found in FAA Order No. 8420.5A, Designation
of Pilot Examiners (May 8, 1973). That order requires the conducting of tests
under the general supervision of the local Flight Standards Inspector (an FAA
employee), and issues temporary pilot certificates and ratings in the discretion of
the Flight Standards Inspector. Chapter 5 of the order deals with the training
and supervision of examiners, which is the responsibility of the FAA district
office maintaining the examiner's file. In addition to a recommended yearly meet-
ing, each examiner "should be advised and encouraged" to attend safety meetings,
flight clinics and flight instructors refresher clinics to keep abreast of new de-
velopments. Paragraph 43a also provides that "a new examiner should be coached
in the same manner as an inspector newly assigned to the field." In addition,
paragraph 44 provides "spot checks" of examiners by means of flight tests,
paragraph 46 for testing of the examiner's students, and paragraph 49 for the
maintenance of a file record of each examiner. A breath of independence may be
thought to exist in the paragraph 37a(2) requirement that the examiner does
not need "constant instruction in maintaining the required standards and pro-
cedures," but the examiner is clearly independent upon FAA "standards and
procedures." See FAA, PILOT EXAMINER'S MANUAL (1971) which provides gen-
eral directions in the training and supervision of these examiners, noting in para-
graph 16e as to "Professional Conduct," that "Each designated examiner must
represent the Administrator in a manner which will reflect credit on the FAA."
However, the manual does not deal with vicarious responsibility.
21 General aviation aircraft are defined as "All domestic civil aircraft except
those used by the scheduled, supplemental, and intrastate public air carriers who
report to the Civil Aeronautics Board or to a state aeronautical agency." THE-
SAURUS OF FAA DESCRIPTIONS (2d ed. 1965).
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ing designated mechanic examiner (DME),' designated parachute
rigger examiner,' designated air traffic control tower operator ex-
aminer,'M designated flight engineer examiner, designated flight
navigator examiner, and designated aircraft dispatcher examiner. '
Paragraph 183.27 deals with those examiners designated for air
clubs at military posts outside of the United States, but since none
are in existence, there is no FAA Order concerning them.
2. Manufacturers' Designated "Representatives"
Manufacturers' representatives are cloaked with FAA authority
and yet are employees of private organizations which are subject
to FAA regulation. Part 183.29 concerns a number of representa-
tives who are also directed by FAA guidelines?' in the inspection
2 The requirements for selection and duties of such designations are found
in FAA Orders No. 8310.4A, at ch. 6 & 8310.5A, at ch. 2. In Order No. 8310.4A
paragraph 4439(d) authorizes a DME to conduct oral and practical tests by
means of certain procedures as to the kinds involved (general, airframe struc-
tures, airframe systems and components, powerplant theory and maintenance,
and powerplant systems and components). The subjective nature of the DME's
decisions is implied by the language in paragraph 4a of Chapter 2, which pro-
vides that "[hle must have the ability to evaluate an applicant's performance, and
is charged with the responsibility to impartially judge and grade each completed
project." One of the few references in the FAA Orders dealing with the super-
vision of representatives is Chapter 2 of 8310.5A, which states "[w]hen an ex-
aminer is confronted with a question or problem concerning his performance, he
should not hesitate to consult with his supervising FAA inspector." This super-
vision and consultation in each of the Orders is only of a general nature because
of the limited number of inspectors.
23 The requirements for selection and duties of such designations are found
in FAA Order No. 8310.4A, at ch. 6 and are not as extensive as are the others.
The requirements for a parachute rigger are found in 14 C.F.R. § 65.111 (1976).
The requirements for selection and duties of these designations are found
in FAA Order No. 7220.1, at ch. 3 but are misleading in being described as
"examiner designations." Despite use of the word "designation," as expressed for
representatives of the Administrator in 14 C.F.R. pt. 183 (1976), and the ex-
istence of specific authority, there are no such designees serving as "representa-
tives"; rather all such examiners are FAA employees. Although the Director
"may" select such representatives, he has not done so. The requirements for an
air traffic control tower operator are found in 14 C.F.R. pt. 65(B) (1976).
2 The requirements for selection and duties of designated flight engineer ex-
aminer are found in FAA Order No. 8410.1, at § 3, those of designated flight
navigator examiner in id. at § 4, and those of designated aircraft dispatcher
examiners in id. at S 5. The three types of examiners are jointly referred to as
Air Carrier Airman Examiners and are selected by the FAA Air Carrier District
Office. As for authority, paragraph 9 requires that "detailed instructions" be fur-
nished each examiner by the designating FAA inspector or District Office. The
requirements for a dispatcher are found in 14 C.F.R. pt. 65(C) (1976).
"Such representatives [(a) structural engineering (b) powerplant engineering
(c) systems and equipment (d) radio engineering (e) engine engineering (f) pro-
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of mechanical parts in the "type" certification of the design or
modification in design of aircraft and engines or propellors, rather
than the examination of personnel' This group is clearly depend-
ent upon FAA technical standards and generally is not required to
base its decisions on human characteristics of applicants.
Other than medical examiners, the training, supervision, discre-
tion, checks and evaluations of all representatives so far dealt with,
are understandably similar. Although a greater financial investment
is required for the customary work of some designees, the common
denominator for all non-medical representatives is the indirect
supervision of the FAA. Supervision is achieved by coaching, spot
checks, clinics, file records, and meetings with FAA District or
Regional office personnel, and more importantly, dependence upon
the "standards and procedures" of the FAA. For example, the
"Qualifications of all Designated Engineering Representatives"
(DER's)" includes employment of these engineers by, and at the
recommendation of an "engineering consulting agency, manufac-
turer, air carrier, or certificated repair station"; the individual must
have "a responsible position in connection with the type of work
for which he is to be designated";" he must have a position in his
employer's organization with sufficient authority to enable him to
pellor engineering (g) flight analyst (h) flight test pilot] are selected and directed
in the conducting of their inspections by FAA Order No. 8110.4, at ch. 5. Though
these representatives are normally employees of a private organization, paragraph
198 of chapter 5 provides that an individual who acts as a Designated Engi-
neering Representative (DER) for his employer may also act as a self-employed
consultant. In such cases two separate appointments will be made and separate
certificates issued unles the applicant presents a written statement from his em-
ployer which authorizes the use of the same designation.
27 The development of an aircraft, engine or propellor begins with the design
by the manufacturer, which is examined by Designated Engineering Representa-
tives (DER's - 14 C.F.R. pt. 183.29 (1976)) who are generally engineers, and
who grant approval of a "type design" submitted by the manufacturer. It is from
this type design that a prototype model of aircraft, engines or propellor is con-
structed. This model is examined by Designated Manufacturing Inspection Repre-
sentatives (DMIR's - 14 C.F.R. pt. 183.31 (1976)) who are generally techni-
cians. If none have been appointed, it will be done by an FAA manufacturing in-
spector. If the examination indicates that the prototype conforms to the type
design, additional flight tests are conducted for aircraft, and other tests for en-
gines and propellors, before a "type certificate" is issued. The actual production
stage follows, when the DMIR's become more actively involved in the granting
of a production certificate for the aircraft engine or propellor.
"FAA Order No. 8110.4, at ch. 5, para. 195a(l).
29Id. at para. 195a(3).
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"administer effectively the pertinent FAR";"0 he is required to have
at least one year of experience in direct contact with the FAA, en-
abling the FAA to evaluate his cognizance of technical problems."
The DER must consult and coordinate with the FAA, approve
production and service changes, and approve a manufacturer's
service bulletins. The DER is responsible for assuring that he or
his employer maintains a complete file of all data approved by
him." Paragraph 203 provides for "Training and Supervision", and
the branch chief in the appropriate FAA Regional Office is respon-
sible for indoctrination of each designee appointed by that office.
The indirect supervision provided by paragraph 203b, which states
that "In general, the designee will be guided by the same require-
ments, instructions, and procedures applicable to FAA employees
in the performances of similar duties."'"
The last group of representatives in 14 C.F.R. Part 183.31 are
Designated Manufacturing Inspection Representatives, (DMIR's)
who are selected and directed by FAA Order 8130.2A, (Air-
worthiness Certification of Aircraft and Related Approvals), Chap-
ter 7 of which is entitled "Production Approval and Surveillance
Procedures."3' The representatives of these manufacturers" must
30 Id. at para. 195a(5).
31 Id. at para. 195a(6).
32 The Order reasons that data storage is for transfer to the FAA in the event
the employer goes out of business, but realistically, the threat of investigation
appears to be offered in the pursuit of safety.
33 However, a certain reservation as to military aircraft is seen in FAA Order
No. 8120.2, chapter 12, entitled Production Approval and Surveillance Pro-
cedures. Paragraph 139 provides that
Certain segments of the DOD (Department of Defense) do not
recognize FAA Designees as bona fide government representatives
in matters of FAA type certificated products intended for the
military; therefore, when an agency of the DOD procures FAA
certificated products from a manufacturer where DMIR's are uti-
lized, it must be determined if the designee's certifications and
related approvals will be acceptable to that agency.
Paragraph 74c of FAA Order No. 8130.2A, chapter 7 is somewhat con-
fusing in describing the use of a DMIR designee at the discretion of the "re-
sponsible FAA manufacturing representative." That representative is not a 14
C.F.R. 5 183.27 (1976) DER, but rather an FAA employee. The sequence of
job responsibilities would therefore be first with the FAA representative, then
with a DER if one has been designated for the design of the prototype aircraft
or elements thereof, and finally with a DMIR if the FAA representative has
designated one for the purpose of determining whether the constructed prototype
conforms with the type design.
"Only manufacturers with an approved production inspection system, a
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.also be recommended by the manufacturer, have a good working
knowledge of FAR's and be at a sufficiently high level in manage-
ment to administer the pertinent FAR effectively. A DMIR "will be
allowed to perform his duties only under the direct supervision of
the manufacturing inspector."'3 The order refers to the FAA in-
spector, but is somewhat misleading because it forcefully indicates
something more than the general supervision of all representatives.
Though it may be true that the FAA exercises more supervision in
these final phases of manufacture, it appears that the language of
general supervision in other FAA orders is the only real substantive
supervision.
B. Individuals Who Are Not Designated "Representatives"
There are other individuals who are not labelled "representa-
tives" by the regulations. These individuals, however, do serve in
a capacity whereby the FAA relies upon their expertise, and their
certification is required. The only remaining delegable FAA author-
ity which deals with the evaluation of individuals is that of pilot
schools. These delegatees must be described as quasi-representatives
because they are not described as designated "representatives" by
regulation." The authorization to test establishes high minimum
standards for schools and individuals who apply to certify pilots;
however, this testing does not really offer much in the way of direct
FAA supervision. Though the number of test failures or accidents
involving graduates of a particular pilot school would serve as a
testament to the quality of the curriculum, there is no way of prov-
ing the relationship between a student's weakness in an area of
parts manufacturer approval, a production certificate, or a technical standard
order authorization are eligible to utilize DMIR's. FAA Order No. 8130.2A
para. 70(b).
"Id. at para. 74(c).
'See 14 C.F.R. pt. 141 (1976). The FAA Order explaining the requirements
and duties is No. 8420.3. The testing of pilots for certification is somewhat ob-
jective, however, since it is contingent upon the passing of a standard written
test. The subjective element in the testing is revealed in the practical application
by means of the flight testing. Passing of the written test, prepared by the FAA,
and reasonable aptitude in actual flight, as determined by flight maneuvers de-
scribed by the FAA, does not provide great latitude in the granting of pilot
certificates. The teaching of flying is through "flight instructors," described in
14 C.F.R. pt. 61(G) (1976), and requirements as to their duties are found in
FAA Order No. 8420.1B.
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study by a subsequent accident or incident resulting from what
appears to have been a test deficiency in that area.
Other individuals not designated "representatives" in 14 C.F.R.
Part 183, but yet requiring "certification", are listed in 14 C.F.R.
Part 65. However, this "certification" is not synonomous with the
designation of a representative capacity because some may be full-
time employees of the FAA," and air carrier," a manufacturer,'
repair station,4' or generally independent."'
Those individuals serving in a technical-manufacturing function
are also cloaked with FAA authority, and yet not designated "repre-
sentatives" by regulation. FAA supervision of such individuals can
only be accomplished by their willing adherence to FAA-provided
minimum standards for mechanical parts and servicing. This is best
seen where, in addition to the issuance of production certificates,
the FAA also issues Parts Manufacturer Approvals" and Technical
Order Authorization." Since the manufacturer of aircraft parts
must warrant to the FAA that maximum standards established by
the FAA have been met, only the quality of the manufacturer's
complete testing would disclose any latent defects.
Delegated responsibility regarding the maintenance, preventive
maintenance and alterations for all certificated holders is set forth
in Subpart L of 14 C.F.R. Part 121." Section 601 empowers the
18 Subpart B-Air Traffic Control Tower Operations; all are FAA employees
and therefore defended by the United States, even when sued personally.
11 Subpart C-Aircraft Dispatchers; Subpart D-Mechanics; Subpart E-Re-
pairmen.
0 Subpart D-Mechanics; Subpart E-Repairmen.
"' Subpart E-Repairmen (qualified to perform maintenance on aircraft com-
ponents).
Subpart F-Parachute Riggers are generally independent.
Issued for the production of modification and replacement parts for a type
certificated product. Regulations governing persons holding one of these are con-
tained in 14 C.F.R. pt. 21(K) (1976).
"Issued for the production of materials, parts and appliances for which per-
formance standards have been established in 14 C.F.R. pt. 37 (1976). In sub-
stance, the FAA approves the manufacturing facilities and quality control systems
of the holders of Parts Manufacturing Approvals and Technical Standard Order
Authorizations for the manufacture of materials, parts, or appliances. The ap-
plicable FAA Order is No. 8150.1, and the general effect of it allows the manu-
facturer to personally certify that the applicable standard has been met.
"Adopted in accordance with § § 601, 604, 605, and 607 of the Federal Avia-
tion Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1421, 1424, 1425, and 1427 (1970). The regulations of
14 C.F.R. pt. 121(L) (1976) which provide the requirements for an air carrier's
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Administrator to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations for in-
spection, servicing and overhaul, including examinations and re-
ports by properly qualified private persons accepted by the FAA in
lieu of those made by its officers and employees.
Under section 605 each air carrier is charged with the duty of
making, or causing to be made, all inspections, maintenance, over-
haul, and repair of equipment. The requirements as to maintenance,
preventive maintenance, rebuilding, and alteration are found in
14 C.F.R. Part 43, with the persons authorized to perform the
same provided for in Part 43.3. The holders of these certificates"
are subject to maintenance certification procedures, whereby they
are examined by an FAA inspector in order to determine whether
such persons are capable of making repairs or alterations." It ap-
pears that after the FAA's initial determination of capability, there
is little more than indirect supervision of these certificate holders."
II. THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT (FTCA)
The FTCA definition of a federal employee includes
officers or employees of any Federal agency, members of the mili-
continuous airworthiness maintenance program, reflect the duties and responsibil-
ities imposed on air carriers under Title VI of the Federal Aviation Act, and do
not constitute a delegation of the Administrator's authority to the air carrier
under S 314 of the Act, 49 U.S.C. S 1355 (1970).
"These include the holder of a mechanic certificate (14 C.F.R. pt. 65(D)
(1976)), holder of a repairman certificate (id. at pt. 65(E)), a person working
under their direct supervision, the holder of a commercial operator certificate,
and the holder of a pilot certificate (for an aircraft not used in air carrier serv-
ice, and a manufacturer).
"'This is in accord with FAA Order No. 8310.4A. Additional guidelines for
such inspections are found in the 8300 series of FAA Orders: (1) No. 8300.2A-
Maintenance Data Analysis Program; (2) No. 8300.4-Maintenance Division-
General Practices and Procedures. The general performance rules for repairs and
maintenance are found in 14 C.F.R. S 43.13 (1976) and are expanded upon in
FAA Advisory Circular 43.13-1, and FAA Advisory Circular 43.13-2. The guid-
ance for an FAA inspector in determining the quality to repairs and maintenance
are found in FAA Order No. 8320.7. In addition to the 8320.7 surveillance pro-
cedures, other maintenance review requirements are found in FAA Order No.
8330.1 and FAA Order No. 8340.IA. The testing of a mechanic is provided for
in FAA Order No. 8310.5A. In substance, repairman certificates are generally
only issued to specialists in parts, systems, or units, such as radios, radar, etc.
In comparison, a mechanic requires broader knowledge as to the entire aircraft,
engine, etc., and would therefore appear to have greater license in making re-
pairs based on his judgment, rather than through procedures provided by the
manufacturer of a unit.
4 5 As there was for the representative listed in 14 C.F.R. pt. 183 (1976).
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tary or naval forces of the United States, and persons acting on
behalf of a Federal agency in an official capacity, temporarily in
the service of the United States, whether with or without compen-
sation."
Both the language of the statute and use of the word "employee" in
legal comments seemingly include a wide variety of personnel."
The paucity of legal writings treating the question of who is a
federal employee, and more importantly, what private persons
could be considered employees, initially favors the position that
merely entrusting a person with some duty indicates employment
status."
The FTCA is limited by the doctrine of respondeat superior,"
4128 U.S.C. § 2671 (1970).
"
0 The FAA Tort Claims Handbook, FAA Order No. 2250.1A (Jan. 23,
1969), repeats the definition almost verbatim in ch. 1, at § 1(e): "Includes officers
and employees of the agency and persons acting on behalf of the agency in an
official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the agency, with
or without compensation."
51 Such is seen in an early analysis of the FTCA in Gottlieb, The Federal Tort
Claims Act-A Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEO. L.J. 1 (1946), in which it was
reasoned that "volunteers" would probably not be considered employees. The
article expresses the opinion in note 36 that the FTCA
would probably exclude tort claims arising out of the activities of
persons volunteering their services in aid of Federal Bond drives,
inasmuch as such persons act in their private rather than an official
capacity and can produce no papers of appointment by the United
States.
Thus, the article ascribes the traditional significance to receipt of "papers" or
other certificate from the United States as previously noted. However, the em-
ployee requirement would be strictly construed, by the doctrine of respondeat
superior. See, e.g., McSwain v. United States, 422 F.2d 1086 (3d Cir. 1970);
Frazier v. United States, 412 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1969); Witt v. United States, 319
F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Taylor, 236 F.2d 649 (6th Cir. 1956),
cert. dismissed pursuant to stipulation, 355 U.S. 801 (1957); King v. United
States, 178 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 964 (1950). Such
strict construction would not, however, mean that only a person officially on a
federal payroll can come within the definition of a federal employee. Martarano
v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 805, 807 (D. Nev. 1964). Even compensation or
use of a government vehicle would not necessarily qualify a person as an em-
ployee of the United States. Harris v. Boreham, 233 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1956);
Fries v. United States, 170 F.2d 726 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 954 (1948).
"I United States v. Campbell, 172 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337
U.S. 957 (1949). The word employee is to be read as having the same general
meaning in the act as the term "servant" has in the doctrine. Brucker v. United
States, 338 F.2d 427, 430 (9th Cir. 1964) (in which the court ruled that an Army
sergeant club member was not a government servant simply because the govern-
ment encouraged the activity and derived benefit from it); United States v. Hol-
combe, 277 F.2d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1960); Strangi v. United States, 211 F.2d 305
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and the employment status is probably a federal question." Difficul-
ties arise in judicial determinations of whether an individual is an
employee or an independent contractor. The courts examine the
"total situation"" in order to apply the customary agency guide-
lines to determine the existence of control, and the "primary em-
phasis" is the control exercised "in the day to day performance"
of his work.' Though it is a general statement laced with excep-
tions, the degree of control exercised by the United States over the
person in the performance of his duties is considered to be the
primary factor in determining whether an individual is an em-
ployee."
While the "right to control,"'.. coupled with the certification
given by the FAA, appears to delegate binding FAA authority, a
study of the cases dealing with the doctrine of respondeat superior,"
indicates that even where the enabling statute specifically calls for
"delegation," such delegation does not include liability for the
negligent acts or omissions of the delegates. The significance of the
word "delegation" is illustrated in Maryland v. U.S. 9 where the
Supreme Court held that under the National Defense Act the Secre-
tary was merely authorized to "designate" the person to employ a
caretaker, and the caretaker should not have been considered as
directly employed by federal authorities. The Court stated that a
construction of the National Defense Act in United States v. Holly"
was not supported by the legislative history.
(5th Cir. 1954); Thomas v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 896 (D. Vt. 1962); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1957).
" United States v. Becker, 378 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1967); Blackwell v. United
States, 321 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Hainline, 315 F.2d 153
(10th Cir. 1963); Pattno v. United States, 311 F.2d 604 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 911 (1962); Courtney v. United States, 230 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1956);
But see Buchanan v. United States, 305 F.2d 738 (8th Cir. 1962); Fries v. United
States, 170 F.2d 726 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 954 (1948).
"
4 Strangi v. United States, 211 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1954).
'Shippey v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 350 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
"See Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 1448 (1958).
"'See Fries v. United States, 170 F.2d 726 (6th Cir.),cert. denied, 336 U.S.
954 (1948); Hopson v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 804 (W.D. Ark. 1956).
" Liability of the United States for negligence of a government employee is
determined by the law of respondeat superior of the state in which the act or
omission occurred. Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857 (1955); McSwain v.
United States, 442 F.2d 1086 (3d Cir. 1970).
59381 U.S. 41, 50 (1965).
60 192 F.2d 221 (10th Cir. 1951).
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In Holly the circuit court was also concerned with the statute 1
which authorized the employment of caretakers for the care and
maintenance of National Guard materials. National Guard regu-
lations delegated authority to Adjutants General to employ care-
takers at pay and with benefits established in the regulations. The
circuit court noted that the federal statute created the position and
generally outlined the duties, that the pay was from federal funds,
and stated that the "federal government maintains a reasonable
measure of direction and control over the method and means of a
caretaker's performing his service."" The Holly court compared
its reasoning with that in Williams v. United States"3 where Na-
tional Guard members were held to be in state service and there-
fore not employees of the United States until activated. The Holly
court thus ruled that where an individual was acting in the course
of his employment as a caretaker of United States property, "as
contemplated by the foregoing statutes and regulations," such an
individual was an employee of the federal government.
In reversing the opinion in Holly, the Maryland Court ruled
that a person employed as a maintenance officer by the National
Guard and who was a National Guard pilot on the weekend was an
employee of the State of Maryland and not a Federal employee
within the FTCA, regardless of whether he was functioning as a
pilot or as squadron maintenance officer. This reasoning seemingly
supports the position that FAA delegates are not Government em-
ployees because, though not State employees, they are either self-
employed or employees of a manufacturer of repair stations.
Though a more convincing argument for some quasi-employment
status can be made when the statute speaks of "delegation," em-
ployment status is actually non-existent. The cases concerning the
doctrine of respondeat superior do not rest upon the language of
the agreement creating the status, but upon the terms of the rela-
tionship by which there is a retention of agency control. Even the
retention of some degree of control by the FAA, either through
certification of individuals after testing, general supervision, " sup-
" Act of June 3, 1916, ch. 134 § 90, 39 Stat. 205, as reenacted, 54 Stat. 1134
(now 32 U.S.C. § 709 (1970)).
"2 192 F.2d at 223.
63350 U.S. 857 (1955).
614 In Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521 (1973) the Supreme Court noted
NEGLIGENCE OF FAA DELEGATES
plying of testing materials, spot checks, or detailed instructions,
would not give the degree of control necessary to refute the argu-
ment of independent contractor status." Certification by the FAA
simply cannot provide sufficient control.
As was indicated above, 14 C.F.R. Part 183 specifies the desig-
nations for which certification as FAA "representatives" is required.
Other individuals not designated "representatives," but yet re-
quiring "certification" for FAA approved work, are listed in C.F.R.
Part 65. Neither judicial language nor legal treatises indicate that
the individuals who are delegated authority by the statute should
be treated any differently for the purpose of FAA representation.
The small number of cases dealing with the matter of FAA certifi-
cate-holders have spoken only of "certification," indicating that the
possession of the certificate would be the basis of any vicarious
liability. Whether a holder of a repairman certificate would be
considered an employee of the United States was discussed, but
not answered, in Kropp v. Douglas Aircraft Co.," Marival, Inc. v.
Planes, Inc.,"8 and Gibbs v. United States." Case treatment of cer-
tificates, licenses, and similar authority indicates that much more
than the fact that the acts or omissions occurred under the certifi-
cated authority would be required to render the United States li-
able for negligent acts or omissions of certificate holders. This can
be seen in Lavitt v. United States" in which the court said that it
would be "stretching" governmental responsibility too far merely
because the United States required a conditional certification or
the power to control detailed physical performance of a contract as the critical
factor. Even though the contract required compliance with the Federal Bureau of
Prisons' rules and regulations which prescribed the standard of treatment, the con-
trol was insufficient. In Kropp v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 329 F. Supp. 447
(E.D.N.Y. 1971), the court stated that "such general supervisory power without
more, is the hallmark of the independent contractor relationship." But see Mar-
tarano v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 805 (D. Nev. 1964) (held Federal employee
because of "direct supervision" of all operations); Delgado v. Akins, 236 F. Supp.
202 (D. Ariz. 1964).
05 An independent contractor is not an employee of the Government and re-
covery cannot therefore be had against the United States for his negligent acts.
United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28, 34 (10th Cir. 1965) and cases cited therein.
6 Not designated a "representative" in 14 C.F.R. pt. 65 (1976).
'1329 F. Supp. 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
"s 306 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
9251 F. Supp. 391 (E.D. Tenn. 1966).
70 177 F.2d 627, 630 (2d Cir. 1949).
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approval before making a loan, and Haynes v. United States where
an individual licensed by the Department of Agriculture was found
to be neither an employee of a federal agency nor a person acting
on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity. Basic con-
siderations in this conclusion were that the individual's application
for employment was to the state, payment was by the state, and the
state determined his hours of work and overtime."
III. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
The absence of any clearly defined rule"' regarding the relation-
ship created between a federal agency and individuals has been
acknowledged by numerous courts; however, no reported decision
has either ruled on FAA delegation of authority to private indi-
viduals or United States tort liability for the acts of private indi-
viduals having no contractual relationship with the federal agency
involved or not employed by an employer having such a contractual
relationship.' An early approach to the question of governmental
"' 327 F. Supp. 264 (W.D.N.Y. 1970).
" Compare Dushon v. United States, 243 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 933 (1958) (employee of independent contractor had to take
an exam as to rules for operating on government-owned railroad track and
acquire a certificate of examination, the court ruling it was not a permit for
operation, but a means of identifying that such person appeared qualified to
operate a railroad car), with Fisher v. United States, 356 F.2d 706 (6th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 819 (1966) (holder of a star mail contract ruled
an independent contractor).
73In Strangi v. United States, 211 F.2d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 1954), the court
saw the distinction between the master-servant and independent contractor rela-
tionships as lying "largely in the degree of control or right of control," but
avoided deciding the issue by stating that there was no definite or absolute rule.
" An exception to the rule vitiating liability for the acts of an independent
contractor is occasionally seen when a public franchise is involved. In these
cases, tort liability of even carefully selected independent contractors may be
transferred to the contractor's individual or corporate employer. These situations
normally arise when the individual or corporation can lawfully carry on its ac-
tivity only under a franchise by public authority which involves an unreasonable
risk of harm to others. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 416-25 (1934), cited in
Venuto v. Robinson, 118 F.2d 679 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 627 (1941)
(a case involving carriage by truck); American Transit Lines v. Smith, 246 F.2d
86 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 889 (1957), wherein the court cited
Ohio case law for the proposition that "the holder of a public franchise cannot,
by employing an independent contractor, delegate its duties under the franchise
so as to absolve itself." See also Proctor v. Colonial Refrigerated Transp., Inc.,
494 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1974). Admittedly, a public franchise is much like an
FAA certificate in that both constitute a license to operate; however, in the public
franchise situation, it would simply be a question of whether a contractor can
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responsibility is illustrated in Lavitt v. United States."5 In that case,
action was brought under the FTCA76 to recover damages from the
United States for the burning of a potato warehouse through the
alleged negligence of three potato inspectors who were claimed to
have been United States employees. The circuit court held that
since the inspectors were appointed by a local committee in con-
nection with a federal loan, no action could be maintained under
the FTCA. The local committee was not a federal agency and the
insepectors appointed by them were not persons acting on behalf
of a federal agency within the meaning of the statute. The Court
found an absence of federal authority, not only in selection of per-
sonnel, but also regarding fee authorization. As to the committee,
the court ruled that,
Its employees or officers were not and could not be selected by
the United States or the Department of Agriculture, or discharged
by either .... Here the government had only a remote interest in
the amount of the inspection fees. These fees were really paid by
the borrower . . . but all fees only indirectly affected the United
States....
The absence of the ultimate control of the United States-to hire
and fire-was undoubtedly the compelling factor in the decision.
It is questionable whether a present decision involving the FTCA
would allot the same significance to the factors considered by the
Lavitt court, but the reasoning of later decisions seemingly leads
to the same conclusion. Absence of control has been found in a
legion of cases" which have shown an assortment of constraints
avoid tort liability by delegation of its franchised responsibility, whereas in the
FAA situation, the statute specifically provides for such delegation, and the FTCA
does not expressly extend its coverage to such employees. See Kropp v. Douglas
Aircraft Co., 329 F. Supp. 477 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), where the court found "that
the Government failed to provide Kropp a safe place to work, which duty is not
delegable. . . ." (emphasis added), thereby indicating a duality, i.e., tort liability
for non-delegable duties, and absence liability where delegation is expressly al-
lowed.
75 177 F.2d 627, 630 (2d Cir. 1949).
" "Federal agency," under the F"CA, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1970) includes the
executive departments and independent establishments of the United States, and
corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the United States,
but does not include any contractor with the United States.
"See, e.g., Gowdy v. United States, 412 F.2d 525 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 960 (1969) (reservation of right to inspect work performed by inde-
pendent contractor did not impose duty of inspection or control on the gov-
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inhibiting the degree of independence possessed by those indi-
viduals who have been delegated FAA authority. Expressions of
independence are found in the performance of work with individual
labor and equipment, and on non-federal premises. In addition,
there is no government compensation, and the services contracted
for are obtained by the owner of the aircraft or aircraft part.
Though inspections are performed in accordance with FAA stand-
ards, the FAA has no control over the details of the work, nor is
there positive control and direction."8
The independent contractor relationship may be limited when
the government is interested in more than a finished product and
concerns itself with the method and means by which the finished
product is developed." FAA delegation to private persons is based
emiment); Yates v. United States, 365 F.2d 663 (4th Cir. 1966) (corporation
under contract with Air Force to do maintenance work on aircraft at assigned
Air Force Base area having the right to inspect the work held independent con-
tractor); Cannon v. United States, 328 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1964) (contract with
United States to have building painted by company which supplied materials
and painters made company independent contractor); Brucker v. United States,
338 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1964) (though Air Force Base club was an instrumentality
of the United States, club regulations were not control over check pilots and
flying instructors so as to make them federal employees); Dushon v. United
States, 243 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 933 (1958) (em-
ployee of government contractor who was required to receive government ap-
proval as a railroad operator was not under government control); Fries v. United
States, 170 F.2d 726 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 954 (1948) (United
States gave funds and loaned equipment for medical survey, and chauffeur of
government auto held not employee); Shippey v. United States, 321 F. Supp.
350 (S.D. Fla. 1970) (inspector for the Georgia Federal-State Inspection Service
driving an automobile not federal employee bcause not the "quantum of con-
trol"); Cobb v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 9 (D. La. 1948) (Army sergeant
loaned to school for ROTC program held not agent of the United States because
under the control of the state and a state school board). But see Maryland
ex rel. Pumphrey v. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., 176 F.2d 414 (4th Cir.
1949) (United States leased apartment houses under a contract engaging a real
estate firm which agreed to be bound by government regulations in contract man-
ager's manual and under detailed supervision, and was thereby held the em-
ployer). For discussions of what constitutes an "instrumentality" of the United
States, see Brucker v. United States, 338 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1964); Standard
Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481 (1942).
28 For the traditional restrictive concept of sovereign immunity, compare the
role of state licensed motor vehicle inspection stations. Their immunity is derived
from the rule that sovereign immunity applies not only to the state itself, but to
those agencies through which the state acts. See 57 Am. JUR. 2d, Municipal,
School, & State Tort Liability § 24 (1971).
79 In Kropp v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 329 F. Supp. 447, 468-69 (E.D.N.Y.
1971), the court used those very words and stated that "[a] master-servant rela-
tionship is not created merely because the work being done is subject to the
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on the choice of qualified examiners and inspectors upon whom the
FAA can rely, unless subsequent review" calls into question the
quality of their work. For the very reason the legislative history of
Section 314 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 provided for
delegation-the lack of FAA manpower-this delegation cannot
be coupled with constant direction and inspection.
Though the performance of work in accordance with federal
regulations 1 lends additional control to strengthen the relationship
and arguably clarify government tort liability, regulations are
merely an additional consideration. Regulations are normally found,
and are the subject of judicial language, when there is a contract
between the government and a contractor." The question of the
extent of government tort liability as to employees of the contractor
or third-parties then arises. Even without basing federal liability on
the existence of a contract between the government and a con-
tractor," a plausible argument could be made to base liability on
direction, inspection and acceptance of a Government-appointed officer." Accord,
Hopson v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 804 (W.D. Ark. 1956); cf. Cannon v.
United States, 328 F.2d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 1964).
so The "indirect supervision" is by means of periodic coaching, spot checking,
clinics, and meetings.
S1 Regulations may enlarge the United States' liability. Compare United States
v. Hainline, 315 F.2d 153 (10th Cir. 1963) with United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener,
335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
82 However, the existence of the contract, even considered in conjunction with
regulations, is generally insufficient grounds for extension of federal tort liability
to an independent contractor or third persons; the existence of affirmative con-
trol is still required. See Kropp v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 329 F. Supp. 447, 468
(E.D.N.Y. 1971) in which the court agreed that the awarding of a contract to
a private person gives the United States only the right of general supervision.
See also United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28, 31 (10th Cir. 1965):
The fact that the work and duties of the independent contractor
and of his employees originate in a contract, in plans, or in regu-
lations issued by the Government does not create a duty by it to
the employees where there was not such an affirmative control and
direction by Government officials over the employees or inter-
ference in the work of the contractor as to create conditions where
there was in fact no independent contractor.
Contrary positions have been taken where additional vestiges of control exist.
See Maryland ex rel. Pumphrey v. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., 176 F.2d 414
(4th Cir. 1949) (contract, detailed supervision, government regulations in manu-
al); Delgado v. Akins, 236 F. Supp. 202 (D. Ariz. 1964) (a person under pay
of government, was issued handbook defining under Department of Agriculture,
document as to personnel action, identification cards, Motor Vehicle Accident
Report Kit).
83 Liability for warranties as to goods inspected by "representatives" of manu-
facturers, to whom they are primarily responsible, 14 C.F.R. § 183.29 (1976)
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negligent government supervision" of a safety program over which
it had assumed administration. While this argument can scarcely
be labelled specious, it obverts the principles of agency regarding
independent contractors, and obliquely shifts responsibility from
the party having primary responsibility-those individuals to whom
the FAA delegates authority. In the case of those not self-
employed," secondary responsibility rests in the employer, further
insulating the FAA because of the absence of direct control and
supervision.88
In Kropp v. Douglas Aircraft Co.8' the plaintiff claimed that the
government was liable for an air crash because of its failure to
effectively supervise and control a private contractor's training and
flight crew selection, and its failure to effectively supervise the
maintenance and inspection of the aircraft while it was bailed to
the contractor. As indicated by the instructive opinion of Kropp,
or for those individuals requiring certification, 14 C.F.R. pt. 65 (1976), is avoid-
ed because the FTCA "does not by its terms include liability imposed by other
doctrines having their origin in warranties, in product liability, or in absolute
liability." United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28, 33 (10th Cir. 1965). In Page, the
court ruled that the United States would not be liable as the supplier of molds
to an independent contractor when the molds were manufactured and used only
by the contractor, were never out of its possession and were used in its own
plant where the contract was being performed. The position of the FAA, espe-
cially without any contract, and being neither the supplier nor the manufacturer,
fails to support an agency basis for the negligent acts or omissions of a manu-
facturer.
4 Where there is a contract, the United States is said to owe a duty to see
that adequate precautions are taken by the independent contractor. Jones v.
United States, 399 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1968). The government also has the right
to prescribe safety requirements in addition to any set out in a contract. See
United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28, 30 (10th Cir. 1965) which said that even
where a contract exists,
the fact that the contract may have reserved to the United States
the right to inspect the work and facilities of the independent con-
tractor, and the right to stop the work, does not in itself override
or alter the general rule of non-liability for the torts of the con-
tractor because no duty is created to employees or third parties.
This includes the reservation to inspect for the adherence to con-
tract safety provisions.
See also Shippey v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 350 (S.D. Fla. 1970), in which
the court found no significant control over the day-to-day Inspection Service.
I Such as a manufacturer's designated representative.
"Cf. Grogan v. United States, 341 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1965) in which the
claim was based on the government's failure to inspect scaffolding used by an
independent contractor; though the government had reserved the right, no duty
had been created.
87329 F. Supp. 477 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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the United States is entirely free of liability when it has a contract
with a private contractor specifying general rights of supervision
and control over the work, including: obligations to comply with
federally-established safety standards;" when material and work-
manship is subject to government approval;" the dates of periodic
government inspections;" when the government may stop work in
the public interest or when safety measures are not being observed; 1
or when a large government safety program with special training
for the contractor's employees is involved." It stands to reason
that in the absence of a contract with the FAA there would be no
greater liability on the part of the United States for the negligence
of FAA representatives.
The bulk of the cases cited herein concern work done for the
government, under contract, for which tort liability to employees
of independent contractors or to third parties will not lie. The
reasoning of those decisions seems entirely applicable, to preclude
federal liability on the basis of the FAA's right to inspect and
approve aircraft and parts when a third party aircraft owner or
passenger is injured, even if aircraft and aircraft parts production
and repair are considered "inherently dangerous."'" Just as the
" Using as examples the standards appearing in Air Force technical orders or
those required by a United States Contracting Officer, citing Craghead v. United
States, 423 F.2d 664 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28 (10th
Cir. 1965); Roberson v. United States, 382 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1962); Bailey v.
United States, 291 F. Supp. 800 (W.D. Okla. 1968).
9Strangi v. United States, 211 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1954).
" Yates v. United States, 365 F.2d 663 (4th Cir. 1966); Blaber v. United
States, 332 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1964); Galbraith v. United States, 296 F.2d 631
(2d Cir. 1961).
91 Lipka v. United States, 369 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S.
935 (1967); Strangi v. United States, 211 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1954).
'2 Mahoney v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 523 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Buchanan
v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 523 (D. Minn. 1961), af0'd, 305 F.2d 738 (8th
Cir. 1962).
"3Such reasoning is seen in 1 L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS,
S 162, at 5-173 (1974):
If the government representatives on the job are negligent in their
inspection duties, or fail to require or enforce proper safety mea-
ures, or if they are negligent in supervision, it does not necessarily
follow that a contractor's employee, injured thereby may obtain
recovery against the United States; ....
"See Kropp v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 329 F. Supp. 447, 470 (E.D.N.Y. 1971),
stating that "The better and more widely accepted rule appears to be that the
'dangerous instrumentality' principle has no place in actions brought under the
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government should not be held liable under the FTCA simply be-
cause of its ownership of dangerous property," more should be
required than the existence of negligence by a party who possesses
"ownership" of an FAA certificate. Although the plaintiff con-
tended in Kropp v. Douglas Aircraft that the duties of the Govern-
ment were "inextricably intertwined" with those of the private con-
tractor (aircraft manufacturer), the court found that the function of
Navy personnel was to review the contractor's performance, and
that the government did not select ground or flight personnel, re-
serving only the right to approve proposed flight personnel." Thus,
the court in Kropp found a situation quite similar to that where the
FAA selects delegates.
Further similarity is found in Kropp' concerning maintenance,
repair and inspection; the Navy there merely provided spot review
of the work of the contractor after it had been "certified" by the
contractor's inspectors." Much like the indirect interest of the FAA
in the contract of delegates as private contractors with third par-
ies, the court in Kropp further found that the government had not
assumed control over performance by the contractor, and that it
was not the duty of the Navy to train or assign any personnel as to
its aircraft constructed by and bailed to the contractor. The court's
language seemingly supports by analogy the FAA position that it
is too far removed from direct supervision and control over the
activities of its delegates to be liable for their negligent acts and
omissions.9
Since this article has indicated that under the traditional concept
of respondeat superior, the FAA should not be liable for the negli-
gent acts or omissions of independent contractors, the question
arises as to the outcome in those cases in which negligence of FAA
FTCA by employees of government contractors." But cf. Emelwon, Inc. v. United
States, 391 F.2d 9 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 841 (1968).
9Kropp v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 329 F. Supp. 447, 470 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
"Id. at 471.
97Id.
11 The Kropp court also noted a "small ratio" of Navy inspectors accepted the
certification of the contractor's inspectors without "physically checking" the work.
Id.
99 The absence of government liability would make the possession of insurance
for FAA certification advisable. The response to this suggestion is that such in-
surance is either unavailable or prohibitively expensive.
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delegates may have been alleged but not responded to by the
court.'" When the question involves the behavior of a single dele-
gate, such as a medical examiner, pilot examiner, or certificated
mechanic, it can be summarily responded to on the basis of the
independent contractor doctrine. However, on certain occasions
inspections by delegates have been directly approved by FAA per-
sonnel, thereby mixing the alleged negligence of FAA delegates
with negligent acts or omissions of FAA personnel. The conflu-
ence of these responsibilities has resulted in a failure of the few
courts dealing with the combined act to define the differences in
positions of the two,"1 as well as the applicability of the FTCA to
these situations.
The liability of the FAA for negligent airworthiness certification
has been espoused'" on the basis of Rapp v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc.'3 and would gain modest support from the citation of Rapp
in Arney v. United States.'" The argument on behalf of government
liability in certification could traditionally only be argued from
the point of view of the employment relationship, and thus becomes
somewhat abstruse when passing from the acts or omissions of FAA
"oThe lack of court response may be attributed to the plaintiff's contributory
negligence, a failure of proof as to defendant's negligence, or a finding of negli-
gence on other grounds.
101 Compare Arney v. United States, 479 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1973) (in which
the "government inspector" referred to was an FAA employee) with Gibbs v.
United States, 251 F. Supp. 391 (E.D. Tenn. 1965) (involving the possible negli-
gence of "an inspector employed by the FAA," and "two independent inspectors,
who were not employed by the Government") and Marival, Inc. v. Planes, Inc.,
306 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Ga. 1969). In Marival, the court equated an "authorized
inspector" (non-FAA) with a "Government inspector," but escaped a final con-
clusion on the subject by stating: "[W]e feel that the question of whether the
Federal Aviation inspector appointed pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1425(b) was an
'employee of the government' within 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671, is not appro-
priate for decision at this time .... ." 306 F. Supp. at 857. But cf. Emelwon,
Inc. v. United States, 391 F.2d 9 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 841 (1968),
in which the court concluded that the United States could be held liable under
Florida law for the negligent spraying by aircraft of an independent contractor.
102 See Comment, Federal Tort Claims Act-Governmental Liability for Ne-
gligent Chart Publication & Aircraft Certification, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1201, 1211,
1213 (1973).
103 264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
1- 479 F.2d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 1973): "The purpose of the certification of
aircraft under the 1958 Act and regulations was to reduce accidents, and the
government may be liable for negligence in improper issuance of a type air-
worthiness certificate" (citing Rapp, emphasis added).
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employees to those of delegates.1" A reconsideration of the tradi-
tional view has not indicated any reason other than certification to
explain why liability for those aviation functions generally overseen
by the FAA"S should stand on any different footing than the work
of any other independent contractor.
The dividing line for potential federal tort liability clearly should
be the negligent acts and omissions of FAA employees, which
normally take place only in the type certification process; even
then liability is subject to the misrepresentation exception found
in the FTCA. The confluence of FAA employee and FAA dele-
gate responsibilities may on occasion make it a difficult factual
matter to separate the action or inaction of the two, but ordinarily
the inspection and approval by an FAA employee is easily discern-
ible. This difficulty is not really met in either Gibbs or Rapp, since
both involved the act of FAA employees only, though in the former
the source of any negligence was not clear cut. In Gibbs, the air-
craft design data for proposed aircraft modification was evaluated
by an FAA employee and additional data was requested by the
FAA. Two certificated mechanics certified that the alterations were
in accordance with the regulation. This homogeneous activity raises
serious questions concerning the quality of the FAA employee's
participation.' In Arney the inspector involved was an FAA em-
ployee, and summary judgment was found inappropriate since
there would have to be a determination of whether the FAA in-
spector had been negligent.
The only case dealing with the acts of an FAA designee, without
105 None of the cases dealing with airworthiness or type certification attempt
to refute the independent contractor doctrine, but seemingly attempt to link the
negligent conduct of a certificate holder with the operational negligence of an
FAA employee. The government did not assert the misrepresentation exception of
the FTCA [28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970)] as to the issuance of a certificate in
Gibbs or Rapp, but was successful with it in Marival.
" These functions include airworthiness repairs, mechanical work, or main-
tenance.
107 The court acknowledged the mixed activity and by implication questioned
the behavior of both: "Thus, we have ... two independent inspectors, who were
not employed by the Government, approving the modification of the aircraft,
and... an inspector employed by the FAA who approved the data attached ......
(emphasis added). 251 F. Supp. at 399. In addition, the court found fault with
the FAA for its improper coordination and laxity in returning the aircraft to
service. Id. at 400. However, as noted above, the defense of misrepresentation was
not alleged by the United States.
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the possible contributory negligence of an FAA employee, is
Marival, Inc. v. Plaines, Inc."8 In that case it was alleged by the
third-party complainant that an "authorized inspector" negligently
made an annual aircraft inspection and negligently certified its
airworthiness. The government successfully defended, but the court
failed to answer the question of whether such a delegate was a
federal employee.1 In the court's citation of the traditional cases
concerning the independent contractor doctrine there is little doubt
that its answer would have been that although the FAA had the
right of general supervision and control, it did not possess the
"degree of control" over the details of the work required to make
it responsible under the principles of agency law. Thus, the court
recognized the significance of the "employee" status and, by im-
plication, indicated that United States liability for the acts of FAA
delegates must stand on different footing from the acts of FAA
employees. There is no indication from subsequent case law that
the United States must be considered an insurer for the negligence
of its certificate holders.
ADDENDUM
Subsequent to completion of this article, the Supreme Court re-
turned its decision in United States v. Orleans,11  responding to the
question of whether a community action agency funded under the
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 was a federal instrumentality
or agency for purposes of FTCA liability. On one of the recrea-
tional outings sponsored by the community action agency receiving
financial assistance from OEO, one of the children riding in a pri-
vate automobile was injured, and the parent filed suit under the
FTCA. The district court found that the agency had been created
for the purpose of carrying out the community action programs
contained in the act, funds were not received from any source
other than OEO, and OEO closely supervised the agency and its
activities. Nevertheless, the community action agency was not an
108 306 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
109 The court did not believe that the question of whether he was an "em-
ployee" of the Government within 28 U.S.C. §5 1346(b) and 2671 (1970) was
"appropriate for decision" on either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary
judgment. 306 F. Supp. at 857.
11096 S. Ct. 1971 (1976).
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instrumentality of the United States, nor were its employees fed-
eral employees.
The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court,
basing its decision on the funding and voluminous regulations of
OEO. A contrary opinion by the 8th Circuit in Vincent v. U.S."'
caused the review by the Supreme Court. The court stated that:
The Tort Claims Act was never intended, and has not been con-
strued by this court, to reach employees or agents of all federally
funded programs that confer benefits on people."'
The Court cited Logue v. United States13 in noting that the power
"to control the detailed physical performance of the contractor" is
the critical element in distinguishing an agency from a contractor.
In referring to a contractor involved in a grant-in-aid program, who
must comply with federal regulations, the court carefully avoided
any suggestion of liability by the respective agency noting that:
the regulations do not convert the acts of entrepreneurs . . . into
federal government acts. (cases cited)
The regulations do not give the Office of Economic Opportunity
power to supervise the daily operation of a community action
agency or a neighborhood program. '
The Supreme Court thereby reasoned that:
To convert the local executors of a locally planned program or
project which receives conditional federal funding into federal em-
ployees distorts well-established concerts of master and servant
relationships and extends the meaning of the Federal Tort Claims
Act beyond the intent of Congress.'1
The Orleans case would thereby strengthen the classical concept
of independent contractor status and similarly refute the position
that FAA designees should be considered employees of the United
States within the meaning of the FTCA.
111 513 F.2d 1296 (8th Cir. 1975).
"I United States v. Orleans, 96 S. Ct. 1971, 1975 (1976).
113412 U.S. 521, 528 (1973).
114 96 S. Ct. at 1977-78.
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